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Abstract 
 
The possible convergence of international systems of corporate governance has become the 
topic of a lively debate. In opposition to the political theory (Roe 1991, 1994), Gilson (2000) 
and Coffee (1999) have persuasively argued that although little formal convergence may be 
taking place in ownership and board structure, corporate behaviour seems to be converging in 
a functional sense. This paper reviews Coffees argument and some of the ensuing debate 
emphasising internationalisation of equity markets as the powerful driving force behind 
convergence. But while the debate has focused rather narrowly on convergence of European 
governance to American standards,  I argue that US corporate governance has also converged 
to European standards: insider ownership and managerial incentives have increased; outside 
board members, independent subcommittees and chairmen have become more common and  
the banking system has been deregulated to allow banks to play a more active governance 
role.       
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1. Introduction 
 
While convergence of corporate governance systems has been discussed for some time, the 
discussion accelerated recently with Ronald Gilson´s thought-proving paper “Globalising 
Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function”  (Gilson 2000) and John Coffee’s 
follow up: “The future as history: The prospect for global convergence in corporate 
governance and its implications” (Coffee 1999).   
 
Gilson (1999) makes the important distinction between formal and functional convergence. 
Companies within a particular institutional framework may change their behaviour in order to 
succeed or survive in international competition even though the formal structure is 
unchanged. Coffee (1999) argues that a number of forces pull and push towards convergence: 
the growth of European stock markets, disclosure harmonisation, the appearance of 
institutional investors, harmonisation of international accounting standards, migration to 
foreign markets and the need for global scale. He emphasises foreign listings in the US as a 
migration from European to US governance. But at the same time, he argues, the forces of 
inertia are very strong: rent seeking by incumbent interest groups, reluctance of controlling 
shareholders to give up their control premia by selling out, historical path dependencies, and 
complementarities between various elements of each systems which make it difficult to 
change one element without also changing a number of others. In other words strong forces 
for convergence meet with strong forces for resistance and inertia. The outcome of this 
dilemma, Coffee argues, is that formal governance structures change very little, but that a 
functional convergence in corporate governance takes place as European companies change 
their standards and behaviour to American standards. 
 2. Factors driving convergence 
 
In economics, it is commonplace to explain changes in economic behaviour by changing 
relative prices (Becker 1976). Accordingly, if there is a worldwide change in corporate 
governance it seems relevant and necessary to look first to changing relative prices as a 
possible cause. And the price measure that naturally comes to mind is the price of shares 
relative to the price of other financial and non-financial assets.  
 
As is generally appreciated, share prices surged during the 1990s (see www.stockcharts.com 
for a 100-year graph of the American Dow Jones Index). After trebling in the 1980s, the Dow 
-Jones index trebled again in 1990s. Such increases cannot be taken for granted. The increase 
during the 80s and 90s clearly represent a change of regime from the 60s and 70s where the 
index hardly rose at all. Furthermore, Dow Jones mainly includes so-called old economy 
stocks. An even more explosive development has taken place among the high tech stocks 
listed on NASDAQ (se www.stockcharts.com for a 22-year graph on the NASDAQ index).  
And the surge in new-economy high tech shares began in  the 1990s. 
   
Although the prices of real assets have also increased over the same period (due to inflation) 
as have bond prices (due to falling interest rates), there is little doubt that stock prices have 
increased by a different order of magnitude. The net result is a dramatic shift in relative 
prices. The behavioural consequences of this shift have been significant. Altogether 
increasing stock prices mean increasing incentives to cater to the stock market in order to 
share in this value creation: new listings, stock issues, financial instruments and services as 
well as new forms of organisation and management. Major changes like these are large 
enough to move the world economy and the ways in which companies do business, including 
corporate governance.  
 
To be sure, stock price surges do not come out of no-where. One can speculate whether policy 
changes, new technology or other factors caused the boom 1980-2000 – and even whether 
changes in corporate governance and management have something to do with it. But for the 
present paper it is sufficient to note that a really large shift in relative prices appears to have 
taken place over the period. To the extent that the increase in US stock prices was paralleled 
by a similar development in other countries, the business world was influenced in the same 
direction all over the world. And in some sense this may have induced the business world to 
move towards similar corporate governance structures (a kind of convergence, although 
somewhat different from what has been envisioned in recent research). 
 
 
International stock returns 
 
Share prices have increased all over the world but there is some evidence that over a long 
period of time they have increased more in the market-based Anglo-American corporate 
governance systems where the stock markets are highly developed compared to other parts of 
the world.  
 
A study by Jorion and Goetzman (2000) compares stock market returns on stock exchanges 
all over the world since 1921. Their figures show that the American and British exchanges 
(New York and London) have outperformed the global index and (in particular) representative 
German and French stock exchanges which have underperformed relative to the global index. 
For example, over the period 1970-1996 investment in the US and UK indices achieved 
average returns of 6.15 pct. per year and 6.34 pct. per year respectively compared to global 
index returns of 5.93 pct. per year. In contrast, investors in the French and German indices 
obtained average returns of 5.5 and 4.5 pct. Respectively over the same period. It is also 
notable that returns to the global index appear to have been much higher from 1970 to 1996 
than over the entire 1921-1996 period – another indication of the unusual global surge in 
stock prices 1980-2000. 
 
Laporta et al. (1999) compare stock valuations in 1997 by estimating Q-values (the average 
market value of the listed companies relative to the value of their assets at replacement cost). 
These figures show the same tendency – stocks are prices higher in the US/UK (Q-values of 
1.39 and 1.52 respectively) than the global average (Q=1.15). And they are also higher than in 
France (1.09) or Germany (1.23). 
 
Differences like these are sufficient to stimulate different kinds of arbitrage. High US/UK 
share prices induce US/UK investors to diversify their portfolios by investing in cheaper 
international shares with more potential. Foreign companies feel attracted to list their shares 
on the US/UK exchanges. And in order to attract international capital companies have an 
incentive to change their corporate governance even though they decide not to list. The 
increasing international popularity of concepts like “shareholder value” provides a striking 
example. 
 
 International investment 
 
There is also evidence that investors have internationalised their equity portfolio. 
Evidence as to the importance of international capital flows was reported in a study 
commissioned by the Oslo Stock Exchange on international ownership of shares listed on 
European stock exchanges. The study showed that in 1997 foreign investors owned 31-32% 
of the shares listed in the Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock exchanges, 22 % of the Paris 
market and 12% of the shares listed on the German stock exchanges. In other words, 
international ownership is substantial and was furthermore found to increase over the period 
1994-1997. 
 
Christop van der Elst (2000) reports the same trend in a cross-country study of listed 
companies. According to his data international share ownership as a percent of total 
ownership has increased considerably in the large European countries over the period 1990 to 
1998. In rough figures international ownership increased from 12 to 15% in Germany, from 
14 to 35% in France, from 8 to 12% in Italy, from 16 to 36% in Spain, from 12 to 24% in the 
UK. Similarly, international ownership increased rapidly from 4 to 13% in Japan, but only 
marginally in the US from 7 to 7%+.   
 
Changes like these imply increasing pressure from international investors for companies to 
reform their corporate governance practices to fit international, particularly US/UK standards. 
Admittedly, international investors seldom hold controlling positions, but as highly mobile 
marginal investors they account for a much larger share of the stocks traded and exert an even 
larger influence on share prices. 
 
 
3.  Convergence to US – and European  - Standards 
 
It is easy to understand why the lure of high stock prices, particularly in London and New 
York, has induced companies (and occasionally even legislators) in continental Europe to 
reform their corporate governance. And there is substantial anecdotal evidence that some 
convergence to American standards has in fact taken place. The increasing emphasis on 
shareholder value. The growing popularity of stock options. Stricter rules regulating insider 
trading, tender offers and accounting standards (as emphasised by Coffee 1999). An 
increasing number of foreign listings on US/UK exchanges (also emphasised by Coffee). The 
rise of the markets for corporate control, including hostile take-overs. 
 
It is tempting therefore to think of convergence as convergence of European governance to 
US standards. But this is only part of the picture. Corporate Governance in the US and UK 
has hardly stood still over the past 20 years. In fact, Anglo-American corporate governance 
has been revolutionised over this period, and many of the changes have moved the system(s) 
towards European standards. In other words, there has also been a convergence of US/UK 
corporate governance to European standards. 
 
First, the separation of ownership and control has increasingly been overcome by giving 
ownership and profit incentives to officers and director of the corporations, directly through  
stock ownership and since 1980 through an explosive growth in the use of stock options. 
For example, US ownership structures have become more concentrated, and the fraction of 
insider ownership has increased substantially. A study by Holderness et al. (1999) found that 
managerial ownership (stockholdings of officers and directors) amounted to 12.2% of total 
equity in 1995 for NYSE companies and 21.1% for all American exchanges. This is up from 
8.6% (NYSE) and 12.9% (all exchanges) in 1935 . Murphy (1999) documents the increasing 
use of stock options, which is a more modern phenomenon. Furthermore, the increasing 
importance of institutional investors means that ownership among outside owners has also 
become more concentrated. In effect this development means that US share ownership has 
“converged” in the direction of European ownership structures where insider ownership and 
large blockholders are much more prevalent (Pedersen and Thomsen 1997). This change has 
both taken place among the large old economy firms, but in addition insider ownership has  
become more important because of the increasing market values of  small, new economy  
firms (many of which have only floated  a relatively small fraction of their shares). 
 
Secondly, US and UK board structures have changed in the direction of European style two-
tier boards in which the functions of decision management and decision control are separated.  
The use of subcommittees composed of outsiders (non-managers) for remuneration, auditing, 
nomination and other issues introduces elements of a two-tier system. And so does the 
increasing separation of the positions as chairman of the board and chief executive officer / 
managerial director. 
 
Thirdly, US banking has been deregulated. The Glass Steagal Act and the Bank Holding 
Company Act has been abolished in recent years, and over the long term this is likely to 
enable American banks to play a more active role in investment banking and corporate 
governance in line with the German system. First, the banks will be allowed to grow larger 
which will enable them to take larger positions in individual firms without incurring excessive 
lending risk. Secondly, the large-scale economies in commercial banking may give universal 
banks (which are active in both investment and commercial banking) greater financial 
strength. While there are signs that the large German banks aim to reduce their shareholdings 
in the largest German firms (convergence to US standards), US banking deregulation seems to 
imply at least some convergence to European standards. 
 
As these examples show, convergence is not a one-way process.  In addition to European 
convergence to US/UK standards, US corporate governance has also converged to European 
standards. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
This paper has addressed the discussion on convergence of corporate governance systems. 
The findings yield some support for the proposition that UK/US and continental European 
corporate governance is converging: there are strong forces towards convergence, and there is 
evidence that some kind of convergence is in fact taking place. However, the paper has also 
argued that current research on convergence needs to be supplemented in several important 
respects. 
 First, the forces driving convergence need to be reassessed. Relative share prices provide an 
obvious, direct explanation of convergence in corporate governance. Coffee (1999) 
emphasises the role of foreign listings on NYSE where the number of listed foreign 
companies rose from 119 in 1992 to 361 in 1998. To be sure the increase has continued, but at 
a modest pace – to 390 in 2000 (according to the NYSE home page). Trends like these may be 
important beyond mere numbers, but in all fairness they are not going to change the world. In 
contrast surging stock prices, differences in stock returns/valuation, and rapid 
internationalisation in the world’s most important financial marketplaces provide a powerful 
impetus for change. 
 
Secondly, the nature of the convergence process needs to be reassessed. There is evidence of a 
two-way convergence both from European to US/UK standards and from US/UK to European 
standards.  
 
Thirdly, much of the observed convergence appears to be a results of different corporate 
governance systems reacting to the same set of international challenges: High stock prices, 
technological change, capital market internationalisation, the growing importance of 
institutional investors. Both US/UK and European corporate systems are changing to meet 
these challenges in an efficient way which leads to convergence in the sense that governance 
systems come to resemble each other more over time. 
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